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Abstract
It has been proposed that cultural evolution was made possible by a cogni-
tive transition brought about by onset of the capacity for self-triggered recall
and rehearsal. Here we develop a novel idea that models of collectively auto-
catalytic networks, developed for understanding the origin and organization
of life, may also help explain the origin of the kind of cognitive structure
that makes cultural evolution possible. In this setting, mental representa-
tions (for example, memories, concepts, ideas) play the role of ‘molecules’,
and ‘reactions’ involve the evoking of one representation by another through
remindings and associations. In the ‘episodic mind’, representations are so
coarse-grained (encode too few properties) that such reactions must be ‘cat-
alyzed’ by external stimuli. As cranial capacity increased, representations
became more fine-grained (encoded more features), which facilitated recur-
sive catalysis and culminated in free-association and streams of thought. At
this point, the mind could combine representations and adapt them to spe-
cific needs and situations, and thereby contribute to cultural evolution. In
this paper, we propose and study a simple and explicit cognitive model that
gives rise naturally to autocatylatic networks, and thereby provides a possible
mechanism for the transition from a pre-cultural episodic mind to a mimetic
mind.
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1. Introduction
We are surrounded by evidence of a cultural evolution process that is
cumulative (new ideas build on old ones), and open-ended (there is no a
priori limit on the generation of novelty). By ‘culture’ we refer to extra-
somatic adaptations—including behavior and technology—that are socially
rather than sexually transmitted. In order to contribute in a meaningful
and reliable way to cultural evolution, one must be able to develop and re-
fine ideas by thinking them through (i.e., engage in a stream of abstract
thought). Since the capacity for a stream of thought is not specific to a par-
ticular domain of knowledge or cognitive process, the origins of this capacity
are not straightforwardly traced to a particular area or even neural circuit
of the brain. We could possess all the relevant neuroscientific data, as well
as the relevant archaeological and anthropological data, yet still not under-
stand how the human mind became able to evolve culture. Data alone are
insufficient to explain this; what is needed here is a theory.
Once humans could engage in abstract thought, we could combine con-
cepts, draw analogies, look at situations from different perspectives, modify
plans according to unforeseen circumstances, and adapt ideas to new con-
ditions, tastes, and desires. In other words, abstract thought enabled us
to modify mental representations in light of one another, and thereby ‘re-
shape’ our web of understandings as a whole. However, to engage in abstract
thought requires that these representations be within reach of one another
(i.e., they must already be somehow related to one another in our mind).
Thus, in attempting to formally model the conditions for the emergence of
cultural evolution, we are faced with the problem of explaining how a com-
plex system composed of mutually dependent parts could come into existence.
Which came first: the associative links between mental representations (i.e.,
the ‘tracks’ that a ‘train of thought’ runs on)? Or did trains of thought
cement the connections from one rung (i.e., one mental representation) to
the next? We have a ‘chicken and egg problem’. In short, the answer to the
question of how we arrived at the capacity for a stream of thought is related
to the question of how we acquired an integrated web of understandings, and
how this came about is not straightforward.
Theories of how life began also face a ‘chicken and egg’ problem as to
how a self-replicating structure composed of mutually dependent parts could
come into existence. The improbability that such a structure could come
about spontaneously has led to widespread support for the hypothesis that
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the earliest forms of life were autocatalytic molecular networks that evolved
in a relatively haphazard manner without an explicit self-assembly code,
through a non-Darwinian process involving self-organization and horizontal
(lateral) transfer of innovation protocols (Farmer et al., 1986; Gabora, 2006;
Kauffman, 1993; New and Pohorille, 2000; Segre, 2000; Vetsigian et al., 2006;
Wa¨chtersha¨user, 1997). Kauffman (1993) showed that when polymers inter-
act, their diversity increases, and so does the probability that some subset
of the total reaches a critical point where there is a catalytic pathway to ev-
ery member, a state Kauffman referred to as autocatalytic closure. Although
the term ‘closure’ has several different meanings in mathematics, and it is
sometimes used to mean a condition that bounds or limits the set, Kauffman
(following in the footsteps of Erdo¨s and Re´nyi (1960)) used the term to ex-
press the property that the set surpassed a threshold density of connectedness
by way of catalysis events. Thus, many closed sets within a system can exist,
and they can become larger by combining together or through the introduc-
tion of new items. Kauffman showed that autocatalytic sets emerge for a
wide range of hypothetical chemistries (i.e., different collections of catalytic
molecules).
This paper explores the feasibility of adapting a generalized autocatalytic
approach to model the emergence of the kind of cognitive structure necessary
for complex culture. In other words, we draw upon a body of work developed
to model the origin of life to model the transition to the kind of cognitive
structure responsible for the origins of cultural evolution. While this paper is
not the first to broaden the concept of ‘catalysis’ and apply it in a cognitive
context (see, for example, Gabora (1998, 2013); Cabell and Valsiner (2014)),
here we build on these efforts to develop a more formal model that allows for
analysis and predictions.
1.1. Comparison of origins of biological and cultural evolution
Although the origin of the kind of chemical structure necessary for biolog-
ical evolution, and the origin of the kind of cognitive structure necessary for
cultural evolution would appear superficially to be two very different prob-
lems, at a formal, algorithmic level they share a common deep structure.
They both involves processes in which elements interact, generally referred
to as reactions, resulting in element transformation. In the case of the be-
ginnings of biological evolution and the origin of life (OOL), the elements
are catalytic molecules. In the case of the beginnings of cultural evolution
and the origin of complex cognition (OOC), the elements participating in
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‘reactions’ are thoughts, memories, concepts, ideas, and chunks of knowledge
encoded in memory which are referred to collectively as mental representa-
tions, or MRs. We use the term mental representation in what philosophers
refer to as the ‘weak sense’, in that we do not aim to provide a theory of
consciousness. In this paper, the term ‘reaction’ will be used to refer to the
process in which two or more MRs interact and at least one of them changes
as a result. Although this paper does not delve into the mechanisms un-
derlying this cognitive form of reactivity, we believe it arises due to overlap
of receptive fields in distributed, content-addressable representations, as dis-
cussed in detail elsewhere (Gabora (2002b, 2010, 2018b); Gabora and Ranjan
(2013)). The term ‘reactant’ will be used to refer to the MRs participating
in such a reaction.
It is useful to distinguish between externally-driven and internally-driven
reactions. In the OOC case, we use the term learning to refer to the cognitive
process of revising a MR on the basis of new external input from the environ-
ment. We use the term reflection to refer to a cognitive process of revising a
MR on the basis of internal input from the mind. The mapping of the basic
elements of OOL scenario to the OOC scenario is summarized in Table 1. In
both the OOL and the OOC, certain elements, referred to as catalysts, speed
up or help certain reactions along. In the OOL these elements are catalytic
molecules, and in the OOC they are catalytic MRs.
Component OOL OOC
Food set original polymers innate concepts
Reactants polymers mental representations
Products polymers mental representations
Reactions ligation and cleavage learning and reflection
Catalysts polymers stimuli and catalytic mental representations
Autocatalytic sets chemical RAFs cognitive RAFs
Table 1. Comparison of the basic components of the two evolutionary pro-
cesses that we propose are productively understood in terms of autocatalyic
models. OOL refers to ‘origin of life’ and OOC refers to ‘origin of culture’.
Despite these similarities between the OOL and OOC scenarios, there are
some important differences, which present interesting challenges. For exam-
ple, in the OOC scenario, externally registered stimuli are held in working
memory, whereas there is no similar bottleneck in the OOL. Such differences
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pose interesting theoretical challenges which are addressed in this paper.
1.2. Structure of paper
This paper sketches out the beginnings of a formal model of how the
mind could have developed the kind of integrated structure that enables
self-triggered recall and abstract thought, drawing upon a formal framework
developed for the formal description of autocatalytic networks. The paper
begins with a bare minimum of background material from psychology, an-
thropology, and archaeology concerning the uniqueness of human cognition
and our ability to evolve complex, cumulatively creative culture. Next, we
provide the mathematical definitions of the basic concepts of our model, fol-
lowed by the model itself. We then investigate the predictions of this model,
in particular the factors that play an important role in the emergence of a
kind of cognitive structure that is able to participate in cultural evolution,
which we propose owes to the fact that is, in a fundamental sense, autocat-
alytic. Finally, we conclude with some caveats and limitations, as well as
unanswered questions and possibilities for future research.
2. Background from cognitive anthropology: A transition in cog-
nitive functioning
We now summarize briefly the archaeological evidence that the origin of
culture did reflect a transition to a different kind of cognitive functioning
(see Mithen (1998); Gabora and Smith (2017); Penn et al. (2008); Chomsky
(2012); Donald (1991)). There is no consensus as to why Homo erectus
crossed the threshold to the capacity for cumulative cultural evolution, but
the cranial capacity of Homo erectus was approximately 1,000 cc—about
25% larger than that of Homo habilis (Aiello, 1996). Although simple stone
(and some bone and antler) implements can be found in the archaeological
record dating back to as long ago as 3.3 million years ago (Harmand et al.,
2015), it is not until over a million years later that Homo constructed tools
that were intentionally symmetrical (Lepre et al., 2011) and required multiple
production steps and varied raw materials (Haidle, 2009). By this time they
were transporting tool stone over greater distances than their predecessors
(Moutsou, 2014), and they had acquired the ability to use and control fire
(Goren-Inbar et al., 2004), had crossed stretches of open water up to 20
km (Gibbons, 1998), ranged as far north as latitude 52 (Parfitt et al., 2010),
revisited campsites possibly for seasons at a time, sometimes building shelters
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(Mania and Mania, 2005), and ranked moderately high among predators
(Plummer, 2004). Thus, cumulative cultural evolution is believed to have
originated approximately two million years ago, following the appearance of
Homo erectus (Mithen, 1998).
It has been proposed that the increase in brain size enabled a transition
to a fundamentally different kind of cognitive architecture (Donald, 1991).1
Donald (1991) refers to the cognition of Homo habilis as an episodic mode
of cognitive functioning because it was limited to the ‘here and now’ of the
present moment. He proposed that the enlarged cranial capacity enabled
the hominin mind to undergo a transition to a new mode of cognitive func-
tioning made possible by the onset of what he calls a self-triggered recall and
rehearsal loop, which we abbreviate STR. STR enabled hominins to voluntar-
ily retrieve stored memories independent of environmental cues (sometimes
referred to as ‘autocuing’) and engage in pantomime, re-enactive play, and,
importantly, representational redescription, which involves embellishing and
revising thoughts and ideas as they are reflected upon from different per-
spectives. Donald referred to this as the mimetic mind because it could act
out or ‘mime’ events that occurred in the past or that could occur in the fu-
ture, thereby not only temporarily escaping the present but, through mime
or gesture, communicating the escape to others. STR also enabled attention
to be directed away from the external world toward ones’ internal represen-
tations, which paved the way for abstract thought. It enabled systematic
evaluation and improvement of thoughts and motor acts by adapting them
to new situations, resulting in voluntary rehearsal and refinement of skills
and artifacts.
Donald’s concept of STR bears some resemblance to the suggestion by
Hauser et al. (2002) that what distinguishes human cognition from that of
other species is the capacity for recursion (Corballis, 2011), as well as the
concepts of relational reinterpretation by Penn et al. (2008) and of ‘merge’
by Chomsky (2012) (for an overview, see (Gabora, 2018a)). What these
theories have in common is that they focus not on abilities in a particular
domain (such as social or technical abilities) but on a cognitive trait that
cuts across domains. STR enabled not just the redescription and thereby
refinement of previous representations but the sequential chaining of them,
and in a way that, through autocuing, could build upon past representations.
1For related proposals see (Gabora, 1998; Mithen, 1998; Penn et al., 2008).
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However, STR requires that concepts and ideas be accessible to one another
(i.e., that they collectively constitute an integrated structure). How did such
a structure emerge?
3. Earlier approaches
We now briefly review the earlier work upon which this paper builds.
Inspired by Stuart Kauffman’s (Kauffman, 1986, 1993) models of the emer-
gence of the earliest kind of living structure (sometimes called a protocell)
through autocatalytic closure of a set of catalytic polymers, Gabora (1998,
2000, 2001) proposed that the cognitive analog of the protocell is an indi-
vidual’s integrated web of knowledge, beliefs, and so forth, that constitute
an internal model of the world, or worldview. In Kauffman’s OOL model,
each polymer, composed of up to a maximum of M monomers, is assigned a
low a priori probability P of catalyzing each ligation (joining) and cleavage
(cutting) reaction. In the cognitive scenario, the analog of the set of poly-
mers is the set of MRs (i.e., mental representations in working or long-term
memory). The cognitive analog of M (the maximum polymer length) is the
maximum number of properties of a MR, and the analog of P , the proba-
bility of catalysis, is the probability that one representation brings about a
reminding or associative recall of another.
It was proposed that, as exposure to similar items or events causes the
formation of abstract concepts that connect these instances (for example, it
is recognized that experiences of specific rocks are instances of the concept
ROCK), a critical ‘percolation threshold’ is eventually reached because the
number of ways of forging associations amongst items in memory increases
faster than the number of items in memory. Following Kauffman’s use of the
term ‘autocatalytic closure’ in early biochemistry, the analogous state in cog-
nition was referred to as conceptual closure (Gabora, 2000), a term we will
use later in this paper, with a precise definition. In this way, the assemblage
of human worldviews changes over time not because some of them replicate
in their entirety at the expense of others (for example, by natural selection)
but through piecemeal mutual interaction and self-organized transformation.
Artifacts, rituals, and other elements of culture reflect the states of the world-
views that generate them. Interactions amongst items in memory increases
their joint complexity, eventually transforming them into a conceptual net-
work, which continually revises itself as new inputs are incorporated. This
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enables the creative connecting and refining of concepts and ideas necessary
for the individual to participate in the evolution of cultural novelty.
Kauffman found that, the lower the value of P , the greater M has to be
(and vice versa) in order for autocatalytic closure to be achieved. In other
words, there is a transition from a subcritical process to a critical process
which depends sensitively on these parameters. Similarly, there is a trade-off
between (the analogues of) these parameters in conceptual closure. In the
cognitive scenario, if the probability of associative recall is low, a network
is subcritical: the worldview is expected to be stable but to have difficulty
incorporating new information. Conversely, if the probability of associative
recall is high, the network is super-critical: the worldview is expected to
incorporate new information readily, but be at risk of destabilization (i.e.,
everything seems reminiscent of everything).
In the next few sections, we take these ideas in a new direction, and
provide for a more explicit mathematical framework. We stress once again
that in the terms autocatalytic closure and conceptual closure, the word
‘closure’ is not a condition that requires the set of items to be bounded or
unable to grow larger. Rather it expresses a property that that the set is
sufficiently connected together by catalysis events. In this way, many closed
sets within a system can exist and they can become larger by combining
together or by the introduction of new items.
4. Background from Theoretical Work on Autocatalytic Sets
As noted, the role of autocatalytic networks in OOL was introduced by
Kauffman (1993, 1986) in a pioneering approach to explain how complex
biochemistry might have arisen from primitive chemistry, based on reactions
that combine polymers. The notion of self-sustaining autocatalytic sets was
developed further (mathematically) as RAF-theory (here, RAF= Reflexively-
autocatalytic and F-generated set, reviewed in Hordijk and Steel (2016)).
Formally, a catalytic reaction system (CRS) is a tuple Q = (X,R, C, F )
consisting of a set X of molecule types, a set R of reactions, a catalysis set
C indicating which molecule types catalyze which reactions, and a subset F
of X called the food set. A Reflexively Autocatalytic and F-generated (RAF)
set for Q is a non-empty subset R′ ⊆ R of reactions which is:
1. Reflexively Autocatalytic: each reaction r ∈ R′ is catalyzed by at least
one molecule type that is either a product of R′ or is present in the
food set F ; and
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2. F-generated: all reactants in R′ can be created from the food set F
using a series of reactions only from R′ itself.
In words, a RAF set is a subset of reactions that is both self-sustaining (i.e.,
every molecule involved in a reaction can be generated from the food set F by
a sequence of reactions within the subset) and collectively autocatalytic (i.e.,
every reaction is catalyzed by a molecule generated by the subset or the food
set). Such a set is a basic requirement for all living systems. Kauffman (1993)
first demonstrated this in a simple binary polymer model, the emergence of
such a RAF occurs when the complexity of the polymers reaches a certain
threshold. This has been further formalized and analyzed (mathematically
and using simulations) and with applications to real biochemical systems
(Hordijk et al. (2010, 2011), Hordijk and Steel (2004, 2012, 2016), Mossel
and Steel (2005)). RAF theory has proven useful for identifying how such
transitions might occur, and at what parameter values.
Our approach here is to apply the theory of RAFs in a form that is maxi-
mally abstract, and show how this can be used to address the question of how
a mind that is more or less a brittle, un-creative stimulus–response machine
could transform into a mind capable of viewing situations from different per-
spectives, combining information from seemingly unrelated sources to solve
problems, and adapting responses in contextually appropriate ways. We will
start with this generic form of the model and examine how this might occur.
We will see that as we incorporate aspects unique to the OOC scenario, the
situation becomes more complex but the RAF approach can still effectively
model it.
In short, although results concerning the emergence of RAFs in chemical
networks cannot be applied directly to the question of how human cognition
evolved, related mathematical techniques can be, as we show after introduc-
ing some further background material and definitions.
5. A simple cognitive model based on reactions and catalysis
At a top level, our highly simplified cognitive model can be viewed as a
continuous-time, stochastic process involving three sets. As mentioned in
the introduction, we use the term mental representation, abbreviated MR, to
refer collectively to items in memory (either working memory or long-term
memory), as well as percepts, concepts, thoughts, and ideas, as well as more
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complex mental structures such as schemas. For simplicity, we view a MR
to be an ensemble of a collection of hierarchically organized properties.
• St denotes the set of stimuli at time t registered by the senses (i.e.,
percepts that arise from sensory experiences). We can take t = 0 to be
the time of conception of the individual.
• Lt denotes the set of items encoded in long-term memory. This includes
the set I of any innate knowledge with which the individual comes into
the world.
• Mt denotes the set of items encoded in working memory and/or long-
term memory at time t (and so I ⊆M0).2 Each element of m in Mt is
associated with a set of properties, denoted P (m), and we let |m| be the
number of those properties. Items in long-term memory encode largely
static ‘invariances’ of the world, while the items in working memory
often reflect variances from this static model.
• w˚t denotes the mental representation of a particular instant of expe-
rience at time t. We will call w˚t the attended item at time t. It is
whatever is in the ‘spotlight’ of attention at time t.
• Wt denotes items in working memory. It consists of w˚t as well as any
other similar or recently-attended items that are still accessible. It is
a very small subset of Mt, of size in the order of 1 to ∼ 103. Thus,
w˚t ∈ Wt ⊂Mt.
There is a straightforward way to define what ‘associated’ means here (in
the definition of Mt), based on a natural partial order on the set of mental
items. For two mental items m and m′ let us write m  m′ if the properties
comprising m are a subset of the properties comprising m′. This partial order
allows us to capture the notion of an item m generalizing more particular
instances m1,m2, . . . ,mk if m  mi for each i (for example, m has precisely
the properties shared by each of m1, . . . ,mk). The items m and m
′ are said
be members of a concept if (though, not if and only if), on the basis of one or
more shared properties, there exists a representation of an abstract category
or prototype of which both are instances. For example, if m = a smooth
2Not to be confused with M from Section 3.
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STONE, and m′ = a rough STONE, then m′′ = STONE is a lower bound
(under ) to both of them.3
More generally, the partial order also allows for associations amongst
items. We will say that m and m′ are associable if there is some property
they share, i.e., there exists m′′ with m′′  m and m′′  m′. Note that
the properties associated with a mental representation are not fixed but can
be biased by context or by mode of thought (i.e., convergent/analytic ver-
sus divergent/associative) (Veloz et al. (2011); Sowden et al. (2015); Gabora
(2018b)). The fact that they share a particular property need never have
been explicitly noted by the individual. For example, even if an individual
has never consciously noticed that wood and rock share the property ‘hard’,
they are nevertheless implicitly associable. We will say that m and m′ are
associated if the fact that they share this property has been explicitly per-
ceived and encoded in memory. For example, if an individual noticed that
wood and rock share the property ‘hard’, they would be associated.
The reason we stress the distinction between associable and associated
is that explicit recognition of previously unrecognized shared properties is
central to the creative processes that fuel cultural evolution. For example, one
might consciously recognize that wood and rock share the property ‘hard’.
If one had previously carved something durable out of wood, this would be a
first step toward recognizing that a durable object might also be carved out
of stone.
5.1. Forging of cognitive structure
There are several sources of cognitive structure. One is innate structure
in the form of instincts, fixed action patterns, and so forth. A second is
structure on the basis of aspects of the MR perceived at the time of initial
encoding, such as on the basis of properties shared by the MR and other
previously encoded MRs. A third is structure on the basis of aspects of
the MR perceived after the time of encoding, such as occurs during mind
wandering, contemplation, reflection from different perspectives, or creative
thought.
As mentioned, the term catalysis refers to one MR evoking another, as
in a stream of thought. A MR that was present at time t plays the role of
3Note that there are other ways that mental representations can be associated with
each other (beyond sharing properties), such as via classical conditioning (for example, if
a bell always goes right before food appears).
11
(and is referred to as) the reactant, whereas a MR that is present at time
t + δ is referred to as the product. Catalysis may be precipitated by an ex-
ternal stimulus—as when something in the environment triggers a particular
thought—or by another MR—as when the shift from one thought to an-
other is triggered by looking at it from (one’s internal representation of) the
perspective of someone else. A stimulus or MR that precipitates cognitive
catalysis is referred to as a catalyst. We write the ‘reaction’ x→ z or x y−→ z,
where x is a reactant and y is a catalyst.
In biochemistry, the distinction between reactant and catalyst is that
the reactant is transformed (and therefore replaced by its product) in the
reaction. The catalyst simply enables this to occur, without being itself
used up in the reaction. In cognition, however, both the reactant and the
catalyst may be affected by the reaction. For example, if x is the MR of
a piece of wood, and y is the MR of an event in which the wood is dented
by a falling rock, this may change the individual’s conception of both wood
(i.e., it is now dented) and rock (i.e., it is capable of denting wood). In
the cognitive scenario, the distinction between reactant and catalyst is the
following: the reactant is the MR that is generally (though not always) the
focus of attention, whereas the catalyst is a stimulus or another MR that
allows the reactant to give rise to a new MR as the next focus of attention.
5.2. Modeling the episodic mind
We posit that the dynamics of an episodic mind can be modeled by
the following three processes. Note that in writing +δ, we allow either a
continuous-time process or a finely-discretized (i.e., nearly continuous time)
process.
Encoding in memory: An item in Wt can be encoded to long-term
memory m in Lt+δ. We denote encoding by writing w ; m. and for
an attended item w˚, we write w˚ ; m. Note that w may or may not
remain in Wt+δ when encoded to long-term memory.
Shift in attention: Attention may shift from one thought or stimulus
w˚ in Wt to another w˚′ in Wt+δ. After attention shifts away from a
particular item w˚, it persists for some time in Wt, and during this time
it is still readily accessible. Once it is no longer present in working
memory, it is denoted w 7→ ∅. Note, however, that it meanwhile may
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have been encoded in long-term memory. w˚′ may either come from
working memory (in which case, we denote this shift in attention by
writing w˚ 7→ w and w′ 7→ w˚′) or it may be a new item generated by
one of the following processes.
Updating by stimuli: Without entering a detailed discussion on the
nature of awareness and perception, (in order to keep the focus on the
forest rather than the trees), we use the term updating by stimulus to
refer to a stimulus-driven change in what is paid attention to, whether
it be social in nature (such as a smile, gesture, or speech), or nonsocial
(such as a change in the weather). Note that we are not using the
term ‘learning’ for this purpose because learning could imply that the
change is encoded to long-term memory; what we are referring to here
is any attended stimulus change, no matter how trivial, whether or not
it is ever consolidated to long-term memory.
We say that the subject of attention, w˚, shifts to w˚′ ∈ Wt+δ, due to
catalysis by a stimulus s in St; in other words:
w˚
s−→ w˚′ and w˚ 7→ w.
A concrete example of updating by stimuli is given in the lower part of
Fig. 1.
Sometimes the new content of working memory is not an external stim-
ulus s ∈ St, but a mental representation m ∈ Mt that was evoked by
the stimulus because they are associated. This association may either
have been hardwired or learned. For now, we will not concern ourselves
with exactly how the stimulus affects the content of working memory,
or the role of long-term memory (as well as goals, attitudes, motives,
and so forth) on this process; what we focus on is the fact that the
content of working memory has changed. Note that, in a society of
interacting individuals, the expression, through speech or action, of an
item m ∈ Mt in one individual’s mind can be regarded as a stimulus
s for another individual, thereby provide a social learning ‘reaction’ in
that individual.
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5.3. Modeling the mimetic mind
So far we have considered cognitive processes that occur in the episodic
mind, which carries out appropriate responses to stimuli, but these responses
are fixed. We now consider an additional process that is a distinguishing
feature of the mimetic mind, which as mentioned earlier was physically larger
than the episodic mind, and which Donald (1991) posited was capable of self-
triggered recall and rehearsal.
Cognitive updating: In the process of reflecting upon, or thinking
about an attended item w˚ ∈ Wt, we think about it in a new way or
consider it appears from a different context or from another person’s
perspective, which we denote as m ∈ Mt. We say that w˚ ∈ Wt is
catalyzed by an item m ∈ Mt. This ‘reaction’ updates the subject of
thought, which is now denoted w˚′ ∈ Wt+δ. We will refer to a single step
such as this type of reflection process as cognitive updating and denote
it by writing:
w˚
m−→ w˚′, and w˚ 7→ w.
As an example, suppose you are thinking about a dog (this is w˚) and
you wonder what your mother would think of it (thus, m is your
mother’s perspective, which plays the role of catalyst). Then w˚′ is
a new opinion of the dog that incorporates your mother’s perspective.
This example involves representational re-description, i.e., the modifi-
cation or redescription of a MR of a dog.
Abstract thought can also involve the chaining, or sequencing, of multi-
ple MRs—such as representations for simple, single-step actions—into
a more complex MR that involves multiple steps. It occasionally re-
sults in concept combination: the merger of two concepts into a more
complex concept.
Another example of representational re-description is illustrated by the
top dashed arrow in Fig. 1. Again, in order not to lose sight of the forest for
the trees, we omit details of how causal relationships arise in cognition, an
active area of research in psychology and artificial intelligence largely carried
out using Bayesian statistical models (Goodman et al., 2011; Tenenbaum
et al., 2011).
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Wood	is	sappy	
Burning	well	
Sappy	wood	
burns	well	
Wood	is	not	sappy	
Burning	poorly	
Low-sap	wood	
burns	poorly	
Sap	helps	the	wood	
to	burn	well	
Figure 1: The lower two reactions (green circles) correspond to ‘updating by stimulus’ (i.e.,
w˚
s−→ w˚′ where, for example, w˚ = (wood is sappy), s = (burning well), and w˚′=(sappy
wood burns well)). This kind of reaction is possible in either an episodic or mimetic mind.
However, in the representational re-description reaction at the top of the figure (blue
circle), a MR undergoes change in the absence of a stimulus; it is instead catalyzed by
another MR. Representational re-description is the outcome of self-triggered recall, which
is believed to be a distinguishing feature of a mimetic mind (Donald, 1991).
Note that the key difference between this process and updating due to
stimulus is the nature of the catalyst: here it is internal—i.e., an item in
Mt—rather than external—i.e., a stimulus in St. In order to revise one’s
understanding of something, it was no longer necessary for something to
happen in the physical world; this new understanding could arise due to
‘putting 2 and 2 together’, or making more integrated use of thoughts and
ideas encoded in memory.
Notice also that there are various ways to model the fraction of men-
tal representations that are close enough to the current subject of thought
to generate a retrieval or reminding event. Under a binomial distribution,
very few items are highly similar to any given item m, a great many are of
intermediate similarity to m, and very few are extremely different from m.
This distribution widens as we allow for abstract categories, of which specific
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instances are members (Gabora, 1998).
6. Dynamics of cognition under the model
A Cognitive Catalytic Process (CCP) is a sequence of attended items
C = w˚t(1), w˚t(2), . . . , w˚t(k),
(where w˚t(i) ∈ Wt(i), and where the t(i) values are increasing) with the prop-
erty that each item w˚t(i) after the first is generated from an earlier one by a
cognitive updating reaction. In words, a CCP is a stream of thoughts, each
of which builds on an earlier one, via its connection to (catalysis by) an item
in long-term or working memory. Newly generated MRs may subsequently
be encoded in long-term memory and thus are available to catalyze further
cognitive catalytic processes. We note that CCPs take shape in conjunction
with drives and goals (though the details of how this works is beyond the
scope of the current paper). Fig. 2 provides a simple schematic example to
illustrate the distinction between processes where CCPs are absent (i) and
where they are present (ii).
We suggest that by providing a mechanism whereby ideas can be com-
bined, developed, enhanced, integrated with existing knowledge, and made
available for further such processes, the emergences of CCPs can allow the
development of a mimetic mind from a simpler episodic mind, regarded as
a key step in the origin of cultural evolution. The encoding of MRs aris-
ing from CCPs in long-term memory can then leads to a more integrated
cognitive network (‘conceptual closure’) which we describe in Section 7.1.
We now describe some generic features of the dynamics of CCPs and
their emergence in the transition from an episodic to a mimetic mind. We
focus on the impact of two parameters: the richness of MRs (i.e., the detail
with which items in memory are encoded) parameterized by the maximum
number N of properties of MRs, and their reactivity (i.e., the extent to which
features in a mental item trigger associations with other items), denoted P .
Here N and P can be viewed as the analogues of the maximum polymer
length M and the catalyzation probability P (respectively) in Kauffman’s
OOL model from Section 3. We will also describe how CCPs correspond
to the autocatalytic network concepts of RAFs and CAFs that have been
developed in origin-of-life research (Section 7).
We begin by noting that whether or not a given MR in Mt catalyzes a
given cognitive updating reaction depends on numerous factors, such as how
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Figure 2: In this figure, the attended item in Wt is shown in solid green lines, with other
items in Wt as thin orange lines; × denotes that the item is no longer present in working
memory. (i) Item updating due to stimulus (the four reactions, with catalysis indicated by
dotted arrows) together with encoding (an item from Wt is cemented in Lt) is denoted by
wiggly arrows). These do not allow for a cognitive catalytic processes (CCP) to form. (ii)
The additional ability of items in Mt to catalyze cognitive updating from Lt (the lower
dotted arrow) and from within Wt (the two uppermost dotted arrows). This leads to the
formation of a CCP of size four. The disconnect in the solid green path near the top is an
instance of a shift in attention to an item in working memory.
closely associated the items are in terms of shared properties, what stimuli
are present, and what other MRs are active in working memory. The rate
at which an item m ∈Mt catalyzes an attended item w˚ in Wt will be higher
the more properties the two items share.
Rather than trying to model the impact of increasing N directly on the
emergence of CCPs, we consider the simpler case of increasing the average
rate λ at which items in Wt and Lt catalyze cognitive updating reactions (the
rates within these two classes may differ, so λ should be viewed as a scaling
factor for both rates). Note that λ is an function of both P and N .
We are particularly interested in understanding how the formation and
persistence of CCPs depends on this catalysis rate λ and a possible transition
that occurs when this catalysis rate increases, which could provide a feasible
explanation for the transition from an episodic to a mimetic mind. The fol-
lowing broad predictions, which can be easily derived in overly-simplified
models (using techniques familiar from branching processes and random
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graph theory), are generic properties that would be expected to hold in more
specialized models.
1. When λ is below a critical value, the dynamics of w˚t,Wt, and Mt are
essentially determined by the external stimuli St. This situation is
characteristic of an episodic mind. If CCPs form at all, they do not
persist, and therefore have negligible impact on the structure of the
whole. Thus, items in memory remain essentially disconnected; they
are activated in response to particular stimuli or situations, and evoke
appropriate responses, but do not transform into an architecture that
is continually revising its own structure by way of streams of thought.
2. As λ increases towards a critical threshold, CCPs begin to form, and
their size increases. This threshold depends on a sensitive interplay
between P and Lt, such that when long-term memory is denser, lower
values of P suffice.
3. The emergence of CCPs causes Mt to grow at a faster rate than it would
otherwise by generating a stream of thought that need not be related
to current stimuli. Such streams of thought may be encoded in Mt
thereby providing a richer array of catalysts in Lt for future cognitive
updating reactions (and thereby CCPs) and so generating a positive
feedback process. This situation is characteristic of the mimetic mind.
7. Cognitive RAFs: The mind as an autocatalytic network
The model that we have described can be viewed as an instance of an
autocatalytic set in an abstract reactive network, as described in Section
4, in which the transition from episodic to mimetic mind corresponds to
the emergence of an RAF set. To describe this more formally, consider the
myriad of ways that Mt could develop from M0 (at conception) to its state
at some particular time t. More precisely, for a fixed time t > 0, consider the
following catalytic reaction system Q = (X,R, C, F ), where:
• F = Ft =
(⋃
t′≤t St′
) ∪ M0 (this is what the external environment
provides (stimuli);
• X = (⋃t′≤tMt′) ∪ Ft (this is the set of all mental representations that
have been present in the mind from conception up to some time t,
together with Ft).
18
• R is the set of all the updating reactions that can potentially take place
from conception up to time t;
• C is all the catalysis assignments that are potentially possible.
R and C are not prescribed in advance. Because C includes remindings and
associations on the basis of, not just a single shared property, but also on
the basis of multiple shared properties, MRs can develop in a potentially
unlimited number of directions through interactions with other MRs. Never-
theless, it makes perfect mathematical sense to talk about R and C as sets.
The justification of the following result is provided in the Appendix, in which
we assume that t is large enough that updating reactions have commenced,
and that the rate at which stimuli occur is bounded.
Proposition 1. Q contains a RAF that increases in size with t (namely
the set of updating reactions that actually do occur between time 0 and t).
Moreover, while λ is below a critical threshold, CCPs in this RAF are short
and few in number, but when λ exceeds this threshold, CCPs become more
frequent, persistent and complex.
We will refer to the particular RAF described in Proposition 1 as the cognitive
RAF. It has, in fact, the stronger property of being a CAF, as defined in
Mossel and Steel (2005). The significance of a transition from linear to super-
linear growth in Proposition 1 is in providing a mechanism for generating
densely linked connections in the mimetic mind. This is described in more
detail in the next section.
This formal connection between the RAF structure of (i) our simple model
of the mind and (ii) a model that has been used to understand the transition
to self-sustaining autocatalytic life in biochemistry, may be helpful in subse-
quent work. This is because efficient (polynomial-time) algorithms exist for
detecting RAFs (and CAFs) in catalytic reaction systems in general, and for
studying their organisation and structure. (For further details, see Hordijk
and Steel (2016) and the references therein).
7.1. Cognitive RAFs and conceptual closure
Our simple model provides a mechanism by which items involved in the
cognitive RAF (reactants, products, and catalysts) and in the sequences
(streams of thought) that form CCPs present in this cognitive RAF can
give rise (via the encoding process) to increasingly interlinked associations
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between mental representations in long-term memory. Formally, we say that
a set C of items in Lt (i.e., long-term memory) is a conceptually closed set
if, for any two items mi,mj in C, there is a possible sequence of cognitive
updating reactions that (if activated) can relate mi to mj, and such that each
reaction in that sequence has a catalyst that is also an item in C. In this
definition, saying that the sequence of reactions relates mi to mj means that
for each reaction in the sequence, the reactant and product are associated
(here ‘associated’ is as defined in the paragraphs before Section 5.1).
As N increases in the transition from episodic mind to mimetic mind, Lt
begins to increase more rapidly (via Proposition 1) and P becomes tuned
to match N such that reminding events are neither too frequent, such that
the network is super-critical (an ‘everything reminds you of everything’ sit-
uation), nor too infrequent, such that the network is subcritical (a ‘nothing
reminds you of anything’ situation), as discussed in Section 3. Thus, concep-
tually closed sets of increasing size and complexity can form.
8. Conclusions
We suggest that it was not a change to any particular brain area that
enabled the threshold to cumulative cultural evolution to be crossed, but
a change to how the brain functions as a whole, and this change can be
articulated using a mathematical model.
It has been proposed that cultural evolution was made possible by a cog-
nitive transition brought about by onset of the capacity for self-triggered
recall and rehearsal. However, self-triggered recall requires that concepts
and ideas be accessible to one another (i.e., that they collectively constitute
an integrated structure). We suggest that, much as models of self-sustaining,
autocatalytic networks have been useful for understanding how the the origin
of life, and thus biological evolution, could have come about, they are also
useful for understanding how the the origin of the kind of cognitive structure
that makes cultural evolution possible could have come about. Mental repre-
sentations (such as memories, concepts, and schemas) play the role of ‘reac-
tants’ and ‘catalysts’, and relationships amongst them (such as associations,
remindings, and causal relationships) are the ‘reactions’. In the pre-cultural
‘episodic’ mind, such reactions are catalyzed only by external stimuli. As
cranial capacity increases, representations become richer (more features or
properties are encoded), and thus reactions become more plentiful, leading
to streams of thought. Streams of thought cause the reaction network to
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become even denser. Eventually, it becomes almost inevitable that a per-
colation threshold is surpassed, and collectively the representations form an
integrated autocatalytic set. At this point, the mind can combine represen-
tations and adapt them to specific needs and situations, and thereby become
a contributor to culture. We posit that an interacting population of such
minds is capable of cumulatively creative cultural evolution.
Our model provides a means of differentiating between the episodic mind
of Homo habilis, the mimetic mind of Homo erectus, and the mind of a
young child. The proposed similarities and differences amongst them are
summarized in Table 2.
Variable Variable Homo Homo Young
(Symbol) (In Words) habilis erectus Child
N MR richness Low High High
X Set of existing MRs Large Large Small
P Reactivity Fixed Tuned to N Tuned to N
λ Catalysis rate Small Larger Small
Wt Working memory Small Larger Small
Lt Long-term memory Small Much larger Small
Mt Memory (Wt and/or Lt) Small Much larger Small
CCP s Streams of thought Absent Present Absent
C Conceptual Closure Absent Present Absent
Table 2. Summary comparison of the episodic mind of Homo habilis, the
mimetic mind of Homo erectus, and the mind of a young child.
We suggest that in the mind of a developing child, MRs are sufficiently
rich, and the catalysis rate is sufficiently high, but memory is not yet packed
densely with enough MRs for CCPs to occur. As more MRs are encoded in
long-term memory, the effective rate of cognitive updating increases as items
get encoded into long-term memory (the more items there, the more likely
one is to catalyze a cognitive updating reaction). This, in turn, increases
working memory, which also eventually increases the rate of cognitive up-
dating reactions from within working memory.4 In short, while the OOC is
4This is supported by findings that measures of performance on tests of working memory
increase continuously between early childhood and adolescence (Gathercole et al., (2004).
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attributed to an increase in N and corresponding fine-tuning of P , in the
developmental transition of a young child to a contributing member of cul-
ture, N and P are sufficiently high but X is not sufficiently dense for the
formation of CCPs.
While our model is individual-based, it also allows for societal interactions
and development. More precisely, if we have a collection of minds (society),
then an item m ∈ Mt in one individual can (through speech, gesture, or ac-
tion) be regarded as a stimulus s for another individual, and thereby provide
an ‘updating by stimuli’ reaction in that individual. Thus the collection of
minds (together with other stimuli from the environment) provides a higher-
level network structure.
There are several caveats and limitations to this work. Firstly, we have
not dealt with the problems that have arisen in psychology and artificial
intelligence in trying to deal with mental representations, reasoning and in-
ference, creativity, and language understanding. These challenges are not
the subject of this paper. Nevertheless, we believe that by introducing an
architecture conducive to self-organized emergent cognitive complexity, the
proposed framework has the potential to facilitate such efforts.
Also, in this paper we have not provided a mechanism that accounts for
awareness, though one of us has proposed such a mechanism elsewhere (Gab-
ora (2002a)). Nor have we provided a mechanism for subconscious processing
within working memory, although one of us has published on this extensively
elsewhere (Gabora (2002b, 2010, 2018b); Gabora and Ranjan (2013)). In a
subsequent paper, we will aim to show how implicit processing fit into this
model.
Indeed, the model proposed here is quite general and schematic. To
make it precise enough to allow a detailed mathematical analysis requires
specifying a large number of assumptions and parameter choices, estimated
from empirical studies. Since the goal of the present paper is merely to show
that, for a range of reasonable values, the kind of cognitive reorganization
that we propose made cultural evolution possible is likely to occur, and leads
to testable predictions. Rather than exploring any particular choice here—a
topic that we wish to pursue in future work—our approach is to consider
generic properties of the simple and general model described.
Other fruitful arenas for future research would be to more fully explore
how transitions in the network structure map onto cognitive developmental
stages, or how different ways of achieving a closure structure map onto per-
sonality differences. We might speculatively suggest that the fact that there
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are different ways of satisfying the criterion (for example, very high reactivity
with a medium number of episodes, versus a very high number of episodes
and medium reactivity) could form the basis of fascinating personality test.
A person with high reactivity might be likely to understand things in terms
of analogies and metaphors and make decisions in a context-dependent way,
whereas a person with a high number of episodes would be more likely to
understand things in terms of their large repertoire of cultural teachings and
make decisions according to how its been done in the past as opposed to
taking context-specific factors into account.
We conclude by suggesting that the common mathematical approach of
two superficially different evolution processes (the origin of life and the origin
of culture) depends on a certain kind of deep abstract structure, which has
also recently been identified in other fields, such a ecology (Gatti et al., 2017)
and economics (Hordijk, 2013). This may prove useful for studying emergent
processes in other fields.
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10. Appendix: Justification of Proposition 1
Let Rt be the set of actual updating reactions that occur in Wt up to
time t (as noted, we assume that t is large enough so this set is nonempty),
and let r1, r2, . . . , rk be a list of the sequence of these reactions in the order
they occur. The reactant of each reaction ri in Rt is either an element of
M0 (which is a subset of F ) or another attended item that is the product
of an earlier reaction rj (where j < i) in the sequence (this holds even in
the presence of attention shifts). Moreover, each reaction in Rt is catalysed
either by an stimulus (which is an element of F ) or by the product of an
earlier reaction rj (where j < i) in the sequence. Thus, Rt satisfies the
required properties to be a CAF (constructively autocatalytic F-generated
set) as defined in Mossel and Steel (2005), and so is a RAF.
For the second part of Proposition 1, if λ is sufficiently small then the
rate of cognitive updating reactions will be less than the rate µ at which
items in working memory become no longer present in this set. By standard
(birth-death process) arguments, it follows that a sequence of consecutive
cognitive updating reactions (as in Fig. 2(ii)) will eventually die out, and
as λ declines further the frequency of such sequences of length greater than
1 tends to zero. However, as, λ grows beyond the rate at which cognitive
updating reactions exceeds µ, sequences of consecutive cognitive updating
reactions become increasingly frequent, and of greater duration and size.
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